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In contrast to shifts in other European countries in the late 1990s, the Austrian position on agri-
cultural biotechnology has remained constant over the past decade. Although Austria’s position
was initially considered restrictive in comparison, developments elsewhere narrowed the gap,
and the European Commission adopted measures that Austria had endorsed for a long time.
Taking Austria as an example, this article considers some frequent explanations for the transat-
lantic divide in agricultural biotechnology that emphasize the link between public opinion and
policy. Such explanations stress nongovernmental organizations and media campaigns trigger-
ing technophobia among an uninformed public, governments giving in to public pressure and
abandoning sound science, and protectionism in agricultural policy that prevents free trade.
While not entirely to be dismissed, there also are arguments against a cause-effect relationship
between public pressure and policy. Differences in the perceived roles of agriculture seem more
important, however.
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The transatlantic divide in biotechnology has many sources, such as pro-
found differences in research infrastructure, patenting laws, financial mar-
kets, and industry structure, among others. Public attitudes have additionally
contributed especially to the reluctant adoption of agricultural biotechnology
in Europe. In this article, I address some frequently met arguments about pub-
lic perceptions and their influence on policy that could have led to Europe
increasingly lagging behind North America in recent years. I use the example
of Austria, which is a tiny country compared to the entire European Union
(EU) or the United States but is interesting because it had already adopted a
restrictive policy at a point in time when there was more supportive policy in
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other countries. Austria thus can be taken as an early case for developments
around agricultural biotechnology that have been observed within the EU
over the past couple of years.
Austria as a Forerunner
From an outside perspective, the European position on genetically modi-
fied organisms (GMOs) appears fairly homogenous. During the late 1990s,
the EU as a whole seemed to have shifted to a more restrictive policy. A closer
look, however, reveals profound differences from country to country. What
appears to be “the” European stance is the result of a complicated balancing
of different countries’ changing views and interests through the European
institutions, which themselves add another political layer. In particular, the
European Commission—in its attempt to harmonize diverging positions—
has a double role, being both an integrator and an important player. Within
attempts to harmonize, member countries have always differed in their
impact on the overall “European” position. Among those that for a long time
have exercised prominent influence on biotechnology policy are France, the
United Kingdom, and (partly) Germany, but also smaller countries such as
Denmark and the Netherlands.
Austria, in contrast, was hardly visible in terms of political influence,
although in retrospect, the Austrian policy seemed to anticipate early ele-
ments of what was to come later in other European countries. Already during
the early 1990s, the Austrian position on agricultural biotechnology was
restrictive compared to the positions of other member countries (Grabner and
Torgersen 1998). Until the mid-1990s, and even later, many policymakers
and experts considered the Austrian stance to be so awkward that they liter-
ally did not take it seriously. In late 1995, however, after the pending import
of genetically modified (GM) maize and soy from the United States, public
controversies arose over almost all of Europe.
Suddenly, it had become clear that plant biotechnology and food issues
were closely linked. In Austria, this link had already been established, and the
Austrian position remained more or less unchanged after 1996 and 1997,
while other countries revised their policies and adopted more restrictive mea-
sures. While dissenting countries such as Austria sooner or later would have
been brought back to the mainstream within the EU, the very mainstream
began to change. The combined shifts in several countries’ positions
prompted the European Commission to redefine its policy concerning the
pending revision of the release directive 90/220 and to issue a temporary halt
to new marketing applications (the so-called de facto moratorium). It
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ultimately resulted in the official adoption of the precautionary principle1 and
other elements that the United States and Canada consider prone to nontariff
trade barriers.
Many have speculated why the European position has turned so negative
toward agricultural biotechnology. Different explanations have been offered,
but the evidence is inconclusive (Gaskell et al. 2001b). In this article, I inves-
tigate some frequent and partially overlapping explanations for this shift.
Because Austria had early taken a stance that became more common during
the late 1990s, I use Austria as an example to briefly explore four questions.
Did nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) impose their extremist views on
an uneducated public? Did mass media campaigns support a widespread and
general technophobia among laypeople? Did governments give in to public
pressure and abandon sound science in regulatory decisions? And finally,
with respect to agricultural policy, in which way, if at all, are European coun-
tries protectionist?
The Role of NGOs
A frequently heard explanation for why Europe shifted to such a negative
position toward agricultural biotechnology is that environmentalist NGOs
imposed aversion to biotechnology on a scientifically illiterate public. This
explanation suggests that environmental and consumer NGOs exaggerated
fears and invented “facts” to support mistaken arguments and that a lack of
factual knowledge prompted the public to believe the arguments and to resist
the proper implementation of biotechnology as a safe and efficient way to
enhance productivity.
Several Eurobarometer surveys on the public perception of biotechnology
carried out during the 1990s in all EU member countries showed that the gen-
eral public indeed knows little about the relevant science. However, parallel
surveys have shown that both in Austria (as in the whole of Europe) and in the
United States, the relationship between education or biological knowledge
and a positive evaluation of biotechnology is rather weak (Priest 2000). Addi-
tionally, the finding that those with higher textbook knowledge are more in
favor of biotechnology can also be interpreted as a result of the “white male
protestant” phenomenon: those who are better educated are usually more
privileged, more likely to be in control, and hence have a better chance to gain
from new developments.
The NGO–lay public explanation also suggests that NGO activity pre-
ceded the rejection of agricultural biotechnology. At least in the case of Aus-
tria, this explanation cannot be sustained. In comparison to other European
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countries such as Denmark and Germany, Austria saw a very delayed public
debate, and up to 1996, Austrian NGOs showed virtually no interest in bio-
technology at all. This is not to say that agricultural biotechnology ever met
acceptance in Austria: surveys performed in the early 1990s indicated that
public attitudes were quite negative (Torgersen and Seifert 1997), and they
have remained so ever since. This attitude, however, was latent, while open
political protest was noticeable only after NGOs had framed the debate.
Hence, NGOs did not seem to invent or impose such attitudes on the public;
rather, they brought them to light (Figure 1).
The Technology-Averse Public
Another explanation is that the general public has an antitechnology atti-
tude. However, although Austrians tend to express less enthusiasm for new
technologies as compared to most Europeans, one cannot call them technol-
ogy averse in a general sense. For example, the swift diffusion of cellular
phones, pushing Austria to a top place within only a few years, shows that
new technology as such is not the problem.
Rather, Austrians (as well as others) abhor certain large-scale, expert-
steered technological systems, such as nuclear power, that carry menacing
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Figure 1: Technological Optimism in Austria, 1993
SOURCE: Adapted from Torgersen and Seifert (1997).
images. Biotechnology, for some reason, rhetorically falls into the same cate-
gory. Risk with respect to food was another type of hazard that in Austria
always was considered especially threatening. For example, although there
was no bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) case in Austria up to late
2001, during the BSE crisis of the mid-1990s, beef sales went down consider-
ably, exceeding the effects in other countries that were heavily stricken by the
disease (Figure 2).
The negative image of agricultural biotechnology has not the least to do
with its perceived lack of benefit for individuals. In Austria, as elsewhere in
Europe, GM crops were considered to benefit only industry, not consumers
(Wagner et al. 2001). While across the Atlantic, even those who do not
directly profit perceive economic competitiveness to be an asset (Priest
2000), this may be different in many European minds. For example, the
Eurobarometer data suggest that the perceptions of risk and of a lack of bene-
fit are closely related. A detailed analysis of the survey data shows that when
asked about the “risk,” “benefit,” and “moral acceptability” of an application
such as GM food, as well as whether such an application should be
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Figure 2: Technological Optimism in Austria versus the European Union (EU), 1996 ver-
sus 1999
SOURCE: Torgersen et al. (2001), reprinted with permission from the Science Museum,
London.
encouraged, the lack of benefit is more closely linked to the rejection of
“should be encouraged” than the perceived presence of risk (Gaskell et al.
2001a).
Cowardly Governments
A third explanation for the “anti-GMO” policy in Europe is that govern-
ments cowardly gave in to public (or tabloid press and NGO) pressure. In
Austria, there was indeed a heavy campaign by NGOs against agricultural
biotechnology in 1997, supported by the country’s biggest tabloid. By and
large, however, policy did not change a lot in response to the campaign, which
is not surprising, because expressed public opinion came after rather than
before official policy.
Dating back to the early 1990s, this policy line had long been established
irrespective of open public pressure while taking into account the latent
unease. The research landscape was small and diverse, scientists were not
accustomed to going public, and there were no big seed or agricultural bio-
technology companies. Thus, restrictions on agricultural biotechnology
helped the Austrian government gain credibility with critics without jeopar-
dizing the prospects for the more promising medical applications (Torgersen
et al. forthcoming). The biotechnology law of 1994 (adopted before Austria
joined the EU) stated a division of labor between different government agen-
cies (Torgersen and Seifert 2000). Responsibility for GMO release and mar-
keting applications were assigned to the Environment Agency, which not sur-
prisingly saw its task as preventing possible environmental harm. Together
with the precautionary principle, which was already explicitly stated in the
law, such a setup provided the basis for restrictions. For example, a ban of
transgenic Bt maize that conflicted with the pertaining EU permit built on an
agency assessment from mid-1996. To some experts outside Austria, includ-
ing EU officials, the arguments presented in this assessment did not appear to
be sufficiently informed by independent (i.e., mainstream) science. A short
glance at the performance of the Scientific Advisory Committee on Biotech-
nology supports the argument that in Austria, the scientific community was
indeed less influential on biotechnology decision making than regulators.
The committee’s advice was rarely considered decisive while governmental
in-house scientists had the prerogative, which in this case coincided with a
nonorthodox opinion.
U.S. regulators in particular often claim that regulatory science (Jasanoff
1995) also has an impact on public opinion. The argument goes that if only
“sound science” would prevail in policy advice on biotechnology, the public
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would trust in regulatory bodies and their decisions. In the wake of food scan-
dals, the European Commission and member countries such as the United
Kingdom seemed to follow this line of thought and made the systems respon-
sible, respectively, for food safety and the assessment of GM products more
independent. While this is surely a step forward, it is still questionable
whether it would have enhanced acceptance if regulatory decisions on GM
varieties in Austria had closely followed scientific mainstream arguments. In
Austria, market breakdowns due to food scandals were mostly manifesta-
tions of consumers distrusting the system of industrial agriculture rather than
particular food safety agencies and their scientific basis of operation—other-
wise, the ensuing boom in organic food and farmers’ markets would be hard
to explain. Considering the symbolic value of agricultural biotechnology as a
proxy for industrialized agriculture in more than one European country, it
remains to be seen whether additional surveillance will secure its successful
introduction.
Agricultural Protectionism
North American politicians and industry representatives have sometimes
suspected that the EU puts up nontariff trade barriers to block more competi-
tive American agricultural products, exploiting differences in their consider-
ations of possible risks. Although assessment criteria are basically the same,
most current regulatory debates between the EU and North America center
on divergent risk. There is, however, a more fundamental difference in the
perception of usefulness. The North American view implicitly assumes that
apart from sound science that could mandate preventive measures, the only
legitimate criterion is productivity in terms of yield versus cost and that econ-
omies of scale play a decisive role. GM varieties increase productivity and
are therefore highly useful and welcome. For many Europeans, however, and
Austrians in particular, such crop plants not only are unnecessary in an
inelastic market but also bring about societal hazards irrespective of environ-
mental or health risks. Economic considerations center on the fear that
GMOs could add to existing surplus problems, so the European Commission
as well as many national governments struggle to reduce overproduction.
North American policies, in contrast, seek to solve the problem via export
promotion, which inevitably gets into conflict with the EU’s regulation on
GM crops.
The economic aspect goes along with an emotional one. While agriculture
in North America is considered an industry, and nobody would normally
think of leisurely strolling through wheat fields, the Austrian relation to the
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countryside, for example, is more “romantic.” Considerable parts of the Aus-
trian landscape do not render themselves to large-scale industrial farming,
and there are still many family farms. Austrian and foreign tourists spend
their holidays in rural areas and consider them to be “natural” even if culti-
vated and to be kept in the interest of country life and an intact landscape.
Applying only commercial considerations to agriculture is a mistake to
many, although some may also think of revenues from tourism. Conse-
quently, there was always support both from national governments and the
European Commission, despite high costs, for agricultural areas that would
not match sheer productivity goals but were considered societal and environ-
mental assets. Additionally, and as a way to cope with the increased competi-
tion when Austria joined the EU in 1995, the government offered small farm-
ers the opportunity to gain an income from a niche market by subsidizing the
conversion to organic production. This coincided with the rising debate on
agricultural biotechnology. Wrongly or not, GM crops became a contrasting
symbol for large-scale industrial agriculture producing “adulterated” food
that threatened organic production, which in turn served as a symbol for fam-
ily farms producing “natural” food.
When United States–grown GM crops arrived in late 1995, the pending
adoption of GM-based agriculture in Europe also appeared to contradict pol-
icy aims officially supported both by the European Commission and the Aus-
trian government. The conflict thus not only was about risk and its assess-
ment and management, as the official statements would suggest; rather, it was
about the understanding of the tasks and properties of agriculture and, by
implication, of the rural area. If agriculture is but an industry sector, only the
producers should decide about the methods applied. If, however, the public
should have a say on how its food should be produced and how the domestic
landscape should look, this would interfere with property rights. In the
United States, such interference would be deemed illegitimate. However, in
Austria, as in many other European countries, food production, landscape,
and the shape of the rural area are indeed considered publicly relevant issues.
In the sense that there should be some limits to competition on productivity
only, one can say that Europe leans toward a kind of protectionism, but for
less blunt reasons than Europeans are sometimes alleged to (Figure 3).
Closing the Gap?
Framing the conflict as being about consumer choice and risk, the Euro-
pean Commission has subscribed to mandatory labeling and the
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precautionary principle—policy tools Austria had long been promoting. The
precautionary principle in particular is a red flag to many U.S. regulators
because they perceive it to be entirely unscientific and undetermined.
Closing the gap, in a U.S. understanding, would entail the EU adopting the
sound science approach of U.S. regulation and no longer demanding that GM
products be subject to mandatory labeling. While the EU emphasizes the sci-
entific basis of its approach and tries to operationalize the precautionary prin-
ciple, it may face a complaint before the World Trade Organization. Con-
versely, there is a certain export from Europe into the United States of
consumer reluctance against GM food products, prompting some American
retailers and food chains to adopt non-GM product lines. Surveys show that
attitudes indeed are less different than frequently assumed, although the
acceptance of GM products still is higher west of the Atlantic (Priest 2000).
However, even if there are some hesitant consumers in the United States and
increasing competition in Europe, there still remains one pervasive differ-
ence. The consideration of economic competitiveness as an asset, almost
irrespective of who benefits, will always conflict with the perception of agri-
culture as a multifunctional sector that must not be exclusively governed by
economic imperatives. Closing this cultural gap will be hard to achieve.
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Figure 3: Percentage Organic Acreage
SOURCE: Austrian Ministry of Agriculture (2001).
Note
1. Although different definitions of the precautionary principle exist, the following is consid-
ered a more canonical one (Montague 1998): “When an activity raises threats of harm to human
health or the environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and effect
relationships are not fully established scientifically.”
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